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# Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset

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## Abstract

Research on UN peacekeeping operations has established that mission size and composition affect peacekeeping success. However, we lack systematic data for evaluating whether variation in tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping mandates matters and what explains different configurations of mandated tasks in the first place. Drawing on UN Security Council resolutions that establish or revise mandates of 27 UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1991-2017 period, the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset can fill this gap. It records 39 distinct tasks, ranging from disarmament to reconciliation and electoral support. For each task, the PEMA dataset also distinguishes between three modalities of engagement (monitoring, assisting, and securing) and whether the task is requested or merely encouraged. To illustrate the usefulness of our data, we re-examine Hultman et al.'s (2013) analysis of missions' ability to protect civilians. Our results show that host governments and rebel groups respond differently to civilian protection mandates.

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## Introduction

UN peacekeeping has become a central instrument of international conflict resolution. From its Cold War focus on ceasefire monitoring in interstate conflicts, peacekeeping has evolved to become increasingly ambitious. Contemporary peacekeeping operations are asked to undertake a wide variety of different tasks, such as establishing security, supervising elections, reforming security sector institutions, and reconciling communities. While the growing importance of peacekeeping is usually highlighted using the number of deployed troops (95,500 in 2020), costs (\$6.51 billion in 2019-2020), or fatalities (132 in 2019), the role and character of peacekeeping operations are ultimately defined by their mandates.

Since mandates regulate what peacekeepers are expected to do, they shape the ability of UN missions to manage conflict and assist governments and populations of conflict-affected countries (Blair et al. 2020). For example, in line with their mandate to protect civilians, peacekeepers in South Sudan guarded several sites sheltering those displaced by violence, the largest of which equaled the city of Bern in population. The current mission in Mali, among other tasks, included strong gender mainstreaming language in its mandate and worked on issues ranging from sexual and gender-based violence to women's participation in civil society.

Moreover, peacekeeping mandates may not only affect what peacekeepers can achieve, but also reflect the evolution of international norms. Peacekeeping mandates are the result of a complex decision-making process involving the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN Secretariat, and the parties to the conflict. Debates on concrete peacekeeping tasks often reveal deep-seated disagreements about international community's operational and normative priorities. For instance, by the end of the 1990s, only one mission had a mandate to protect civilians (the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone). Over the past two decades, the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations reveal that civilian protection has become a manifestation of international norms of human security and responsibility to protect. More than ninety-five percent of today's peacekeeping mandates include civilian protection tasks.<sup>5</sup>

Beyond these examples, however, comprehensive cross-national and time-varying data on tasks in UN peacekeeping mandates are not yet available. As a result, researchers have made assumptions about mandate homogeneity, relied on simplified proxy measures, or overlooked

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<sup>5</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protecting-civilians>. Accessed November 2020.

mandates completely. To rectify this situation, this article introduces the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset covering all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1991-2017 period. The PEMA dataset provides systematic, human-coded data on a comprehensive set of peacekeeping tasks that are mandated by UNSC resolutions.

The PEMA dataset extends existing data collections on peacekeeping mandates in three important ways. First, the PEMA dataset captures the evolution of mandated tasks over the full lifespan of a peacekeeping operation. Existing data sources focus on initial mandates and do not cover mandate modification once the peacekeepers deploy (Mullenbach 2017; Diehl & Druckman 2018; Benson & Tucker 2019; Clayton et al. 2020). Second, it records a more complete set of mandated tasks than existing data collections. The largest number of distinct peacekeeping-specific tasks (11 tasks) is currently found in a dataset by Diehl and Druckman (2018).<sup>6</sup> By contrast, the PEMA dataset offers information on 39 tasks. For instance, the PEMA dataset splits the task of “promoting rule of law/civil society” recorded by Diehl and Druckman into 7 tasks, namely (i) police reform, (ii) military reform, (iii) justice sector reform, (iv) transitional justice, (v) prison reform, (vi) civil society; and (vii) media. Finally, the PEMA dataset is the first one to capture the modality of peacekeepers’ engagement (monitoring, assisting, or providing security) for each task. For instance, PEMA distinguishes whether peacekeepers are mandated to merely monitor elections, assist with their organization, or provide electoral security.

A panel dataset of peacekeeping tasks is long overdue. It will help advance scholarship on UN peacekeeping and international politics in two principal ways. First, the PEMA dataset provides a vital addition to quantitative studies on peacekeeping, which have so far focused on the number of uniformed personnel, such as troops and police (e.g., Hultman et al. 2013, 2019), mission composition (e.g., Karim and Beardsley 2017; Bove et al. 2020; Belgioioso et al. 2020), and subnational geographic deployment of peacekeepers (e.g., Ruggeri et al. 2017; Fjelde et al. 2019; Phayal and Prins 2020). However, even a large peacekeeping force may have little impact if it does not have the mandate to proactively ensure stability and assist national institutions with conflict mitigation, political transition, and good governance. We argue and show in our replication of the analysis by Hultman et al. (2013) that, beyond personnel numbers, mandated tasks can also influence the effectiveness of peacekeeping

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<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, the dataset by Diehl and Druckman (2017) is not publicly available.

operations in important ways. Thus, scholars interested in peacekeeping as a tool of conflict resolution may find our data valuable for their work. Second, the PEMA dataset sets the stage for several new research avenues on international organizations, foreign policy, and multilateral negotiations. Since UNSC members negotiate over each task that is included in new and revised peacekeeping mandates, with input by the UN Secretariat and under pressure from civil society, the PEMA dataset will be of interest to those who study those negotiations from a variety of perspectives.

The rest of this article has five parts. In the first section, we explain why peacekeeping mandates are important by describing how they are negotiated and connected to global political processes. In the second section, we review existing qualitative and quantitative research on peacekeeping mandates, demonstrating that no comprehensive dataset of mandated tasks exists. In the third section, we present the PEMA dataset, including the variables, sources, and main coding procedures. In the fourth section, we provide an overview of descriptive patterns in the data. In the fifth section, we discuss two major research avenues that the PEMA dataset opens. In the sixth section, to illustrate the usefulness of PEMA, we replicate and extend Hultman et al.'s (2013) study of UN peacekeepers' ability to reduce violence against civilians, showing that mandates matter and have different implications for governments and rebels perpetrating violence against civilians. We conclude by discussing how ongoing and future research can further benefit from the PEMA dataset.

## **Why Study UN Peacekeeping Mandates?**

The UNSC negotiates peacekeeping mandates, which specify the duration and tasks of peacekeeping operations. In addition to the initial mandate, the Council regularly issues resolutions either to extend a peacekeeping mission's mandate or to authorize the mission's withdrawal. Extensions are frequently accompanied by mandate revisions to include new tasks and discontinue old ones. The mandate serves as a framework for peacekeepers' activities on the ground. Although UN officials and commanders have some scope for interpreting their mandates (Karlsrud 2013), Security Council resolutions serve as the legal basis for their actions. They also represent an expression of the Council's resolve, providing an important resource for peacekeeping missions relying on the international community's political support in engaging with national authorities and rebel groups.

The three decades of post-Cold-War peacekeeping witnessed several cycles of expansion and contraction. Presently, peacekeeping mandates have become so complex that they have been compared to “Christmas trees” which various actors seek to “adorn” with their preferred provisions (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2020).<sup>7</sup> In parallel, negotiations on both revised and new mandates became increasingly contentious in the late 2010s. Russia and China started questioning liberal provisions in peacekeeping resolutions, for example, by resisting aspects of the women, peace and security agenda (Security Council Report 2017). Western states also downscaled peacekeeping ambitions from nation-building, democratization, and reconciliation to focus on narrower priorities, such as stabilization (Karlsrud 2019; Hunt and Curran 2020). Peacekeeping mandate negotiations offer a window into normative priorities of the international society as well as power dynamics within it.

The substantive content of peacekeeping mandates has crucial implications for a wide variety of stakeholders. First, mandates affect UN peacekeeping missions themselves and particularly their resources. Although their budgets are decided in the UN General Assembly’s committees, the tasks outlined in UNSC mandates broadly shape the size and composition of their uniformed and civilian components. For example, the inclusion of a mandated task on protection of civilians (POC) has implications for the force generation process, which in this case should prioritize personnel trained and equipped to patrol, liaise with the local population, and gather intelligence in order to be able to prevent, preempt, or stop civilian victimization. Mandates also affect countries’ willingness to contribute troops to specific missions. For example, Brazil prefers participating in operations with tasks that focus on reconstruction and development (Da Fontoura and Uziel 2017).

Second, peacekeeping mandates affect countries where missions are deployed. They determine the types of assurance and assistance that peacekeepers can offer to the host government, rebel groups, neighboring countries, and the local population (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Mandates are consequential for peacekeeping success. For instance, research shows that traditional and monitoring missions are less effective in reducing the risk of war recurrence than missions with a multidimensional mandate that tasks peacekeepers to engage in peace- and state-building (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2006). This research suggests that mandate design is an important factor to consider when evaluating the effectiveness of multidimensional operations,

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<sup>7</sup> Attempts to reign in this tendency in the second half of the 2010s were met with limited success.

and its findings call for more research on how variation in the prevalence of specific tasks within multidimensional mandates shape conflict resolution success or failure.

Third, mandates affect peacekeeping missions' partners. For example, humanitarian and development NGOs have expressed concerns that peacekeepers who are tasked to assist refugees or protect children encroach on the formers' policy domain and threaten the independence of humanitarian action (Marín 2017). Moreover, research suggests that mandates to use offensive force have endangered activities of local civil society actors and international NGOs that partner with peacekeepers (e.g., Karlsrud 2015, 45). As such, what peacekeepers are mandated to do influences relationships between the various international actors engaged in conflict-affected countries.

Overall, systematic, empirical analysis of mandates is necessary and timely. The PEMA dataset allows researchers to investigate the design of peacekeeping mandates and how variation in mandates affects peacekeeping outcomes. It also illuminates the broad changes in peacekeeping politics caused by normative and power shifts in the Security Council. In the following section, we review the state of the peacekeeping literature and the steps taken in the direction of studying mandates and their variation.

## **Existing Data on Peacekeeping Mandates**

Both qualitative and quantitative studies have collected information on UN peacekeeping mandates. Yet, as we show below, existing datasets leave important gaps in our knowledge: (i) they are incomplete in terms of the increasingly wide variety of mandated tasks; (ii) they do not systematically capture whether peacekeepers are requested to monitor these tasks or provide assistance and security; and (iii) they only cover initial mandates and thus fail to capture the evolution of tasks over the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation.

Most qualitative studies have focused on in-depth single-mission analyses of intergovernmental mandate negotiations, such as on the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (Weinlich 2014) or the UN mission in South Sudan (Dijkstra 2015). However, some qualitative studies look at many peacekeeping mandates. For example, the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Koops et al. 2015) reproduces the texts of all initial peacekeeping mandates. Franke and Warnecke (2009) classify mandate

provisions into four broad categories: security and public order, socio-economic well-being, governance and participation, or justice and reconciliation. However, while these studies have collected valuable information on mandated tasks, they have not turned this information into data that can be used in quantitative, comparative studies. Moreover, they give a ‘snapshot’ view of peacekeeping mandates, focusing on the initial mandates of a mission.

Early quantitative studies have categorized peacekeeping operations into broad mission types, i.e. traditional, monitoring, enforcement, and multidimensional missions (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008). However, these categories are ambiguous. For example, the difference between traditional and monitoring missions has more to do with mission posture than tasks: monitoring missions are “typically less well armed (or unarmed) and focused on monitoring and reporting,” but traditional missions also “monitor a truce” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 13-14). At the same time, there is a considerable variation in tasks that multidimensional missions perform, which may include electoral support, local-level reconciliation, ex-combatant reintegration, and justice reform (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 16). The “multidimensional” category calls for additional disaggregation.

More recent quantitative studies have taken further steps to classify peacekeeping mandates into more specific functions. Yet, none of these efforts captures the breadth of peacekeepers’ tasks as detailed in UNSC resolutions. Clayton et al. (2020) provide a classification of UN peace initiatives (UNPI), including peacekeeping missions but also sanctions committees, mediators, tribunals, and investigative bodies. The UNPI dataset indicates some of the functions that peacekeepers may perform, (e.g. election support or security sector reform). The list also includes functions that peacekeeping missions embody (‘peacekeeping’ is one of the categories) or do not perform, such as assisting intergovernmental decision-making, fact finding, and decolonization. Finally, all functions remain at a high level of aggregation. For instance, for security sector reform, the data does not tell us whether peacekeepers only assist military reform or also engage with police personnel, the justice sector, and the penitentiary system. It should be noted that UNPI focuses on all UN peace initiatives, hence the coding has to be broad enough to compare heterogeneous initiatives. While it is a very well-suited source to understand UN’s approach to conflict resolution, it does not provide fine-grained information on peacekeeping mandates.



Benson and Tucker (2019) code seven categories of tasks in initial peacekeeping mandates for analyzing UNSC attention to a specific conflict. These tasks are security for civilians or aid operations; the protection of women and children; implementation of peace agreements; DDR; implementation of ceasefires; implementation of elections; and army and police training. While these broad categories fulfill the purpose of their analysis, there are crucial differences within each task category. For example, peace agreements usually contain a series of complex provisions. Therefore, whether peacekeepers support the implementation of peace agreements does not tell us much about what peacekeepers are requested to do on the ground.

Mullenbach (2017) provides an overview of peacekeeping responsibilities in the *Third Party Peacekeeping Missions* dataset, coding six “purposes” of initial mandates of both UN and non-UN missions: maintaining law and order; monitoring/verifying ceasefires; monitoring/verifying disarmament, demobilization of disengagement of combatants; protecting/delivering humanitarian assistance; providing security for refugee camps, airports, elections, government buildings, and UN facilities; and maintaining buffer zones. While this dataset is valuable for understanding the tasks of uniformed personnel, it does not capture the peace- and state-building responsibilities of civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, important tasks, that researchers may want to analyze separately, are grouped together in broad categories. For example, providing security for UN facilities implies protecting the mission itself, while providing security for elections or government buildings entails a much more substantial contribution to the restoration and extension of legitimate state authority.

Finally, Diehl and Druckman (2018) offer the most fine-grained distinction of mission functions so far. They record 11 sets of peacekeeping functions, which they label “missions.” Table 1 lists their categories of tasks and shows how they compare to the tasks in the PEMA dataset. For example, the PEMA dataset disaggregates democracy assistance into activities targeted at institutions such as parliaments (democratic institutions), voters (voter education), political parties (political party assistance), and elections (electoral security and assistance).

*Table 1. Comparison between Diehl and Druckman (2018) and PEMA.*

<b>Diehl and Druckman 2018</b>	<b>PEMA</b>
Traditional	Ceasefire
	Peace Process
Humanitarian Assistance	Humanitarian Relief
	Refugees and IDPs
Election Supervision/Democratization	Democratic institutions
	Electoral Security
	Electoral Assistance
	Voter Education
	Assistance to Political Parties
Preventive Deployment <sup>8</sup>	N/A
DDR	Disarmament and Demobilization
	Reintegration
Pacification/Coercive Peacekeeping	Arms Embargo
	Offensive Operations
	Use of Force
Human Rights Protection/Protect Threatened Groups	Protection of Civilians
	Human Rights
	Children Rights
	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
	Gender Mainstreaming
Local Security/Law and Order	Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

<sup>8</sup> Preventive deployment refers to the timing of the operation, which arrives before hostilities begin, rather than its tasks. The only preventive deployment in the UN's history, in Macedonia, had tasks that could be found in the mandates of other operations as well, chiefly border control in the monitoring modality.

	Demilitarization
Promoting Rule of Law/Civil Society	Police Reform
	Military Reform
	Justice Sector Reform
	Transitional Justice
	Prison Reform
	Civil Society
	Media
	Legal Reform
Local Governance/Government Services	Border Control
	Resources Management
	State Authority
	Economic Development
	Public Health
Restoration/Reconciliation	Power Sharing
	Reconciliation
	Local Reconciliation
	Regional Reconciliation

In summary, the PEMA dataset can make three key additions to these existing efforts. First, extant works opt for a high degree of aggregation of peacekeeping tasks. This conceals important variation between missions and has led to a proliferation of classification schemes that are not easily comparable. The PEMA dataset offers highly granular data on specific tasks in peacekeeping mandates, developed inductively and closely following UNSC resolution texts.

Second, the PEMA dataset unpacks tasks not only in relation to the specific policy domain in which peacekeepers are expected to work (e.g., police reform and military reform rather than aggregate security sector reforms) but also their level of engagement. As described in detail below, we code whether peacekeepers assist, monitor, or provide security. For example,

peacekeepers may assist in providing relief to displaced populations, monitor this activity, or provide physical protection to actors helping those vulnerable populations.

Third, none of the studies cited above code variation in mandates over time. The PEMA dataset records not only tasks that appear in initial mandates but also whether and how they change over the mission's lifespan. Most missions go through several stages, often starting with an initial monitoring role, expanding into an ambitious programme of support to the political transition, and switching to a capacity-building and advisory mode closer to drawdown. Understanding these changes is essential, as we demonstrate using the example of the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) below.

In short, existing data sources are, to different extents, incomplete in terms of mandated tasks, do not differentiate between modalities of engagement, and cover only initial mandates. They do not provide a solid basis for answering questions about the effects of mandates on peacekeeping outcomes or the politics of mandate negotiations.

## **The PEMA Dataset: Selection, Variables, and Coding**

The PEMA dataset codes UN Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping operations in Africa authorized from 1991 to 2017. This temporal and geographical scope covers all recent multidimensional peacekeeping missions and makes the PEMA dataset compatible with other existing data collection efforts, which often focus on peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bromley 2018; Cil et al. 2020, Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2020). To create the data, we downloaded UNSC resolutions on peacekeeping missions from the Council's website<sup>9</sup> and coded 386 resolutions in total, covering 27 peacekeeping missions over time.<sup>10</sup> Each document has been coded twice independently by two authors and then each discrepancy has been discussed to agree on the final coding. The Codebook in the Appendix discusses the coding rules and the coding decisions in detail and with examples. The dataset includes the resolution and exact paragraph number on which each coding decision is based, which allows users to check and replicate the data collection.

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<sup>9</sup> <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0>. Accessed March 2020.

<sup>10</sup> List of coded missions in alphabetical order: MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, UNOMUR, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II.

The PEMA dataset records information on mandated tasks at the mission-resolution level. This means that PEMA is the first panel dataset on UN missions' mandates, with each row of data corresponding to a new Security Council resolution. Beyond a set of identification variables, including the acronym of the mission, the host country, the number of the resolution, and its publication date, the PEMA dataset includes two main sets of substantive variables.

The first set of variables relates to the content of the mandate. We code 39 different types of tasks. A mission can potentially have all tasks assigned. The tasks include stability-related tasks such as disarmament and demobilization or the use of force, peacebuilding-related tasks such as electoral assistance or legal reform, and rights-based tasks such as human rights and children's rights. The Codebook in the Appendix provides the full list of tasks (also in Table 1) and examples from UNSC resolutions that illustrate the substantive differences between them.

We can demonstrate the need for this fine-grained disaggregation of peacekeeping tasks using two examples. The first example is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, often analyzed as one category, DDR. In the PEMA dataset, disarmament and demobilization are coded separately from reintegration. Disarmament and demobilization have been established features of peacekeeping mandates since the early 1990s. Reintegration was much more contested: it required additional funding in peacekeeping budgets, and member states were reluctant to spend money on ex-combatants who might have committed war crimes. UN officials managed to secure the addition of this task to some peacekeeping mandates by reframing it as "reinsertion" and promising to request funds only in the mission's first year (Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann 2011). Disaggregating DDR into two categories allows us to reflect such nuanced differences.

The second example is reconciliation. The few studies that list it as a separate category do not differentiate between national, local, and regional reconciliation. However, Autesserre (2010) argues that the peacekeeping mission in the DRC has been ineffective because it focused on national-level reconciliation and ignored local conflicts. While the mission eventually started paying some attention to local reconciliation, it was further called upon to offer greater support to the government in mending relations with its neighbors (International Crisis Group 2019).

By including categories for different types of reconciliation, the PEMA dataset enables research into varying and level-dependent effects.

For each of the 39 tasks, the PEMA dataset also records the *modality of engagement* expected from the mission. Modality refers to the form of peacekeepers' involvement in a policy field. We code three different modalities: monitoring, assisting, and securing. We code a task as *monitoring* if it engages mission personnel as observers and there is no direct involvement in implementation. We code a task as *assisting* if mission personnel are requested to help implement a task, for example, by providing support to electoral management bodies. Assistance includes coordinating activities and supporting their implementation, including by offering good offices, technical assistance, or logistical support. Finally, we code a task as *securing* if it involves peacekeepers providing security (relying on the direct or indirect use of military means), such as establishing humanitarian corridors or guarding polling stations against violent interference.

Moreover, we record the *strength of the mandate provisions* by specifying whether the UNSC *requests* a task or merely *encourages* it. For example, the Council can request the mission to use public information campaigns to increase awareness of the mission's activities, but oftentimes this task is only encouraged. For requested tasks, we code whether the Council asks peacekeepers to monitor, assist, or secure the activities. By contrast, for encouraged tasks, resolutions normally do not explicitly refer to the modality of engagement, and we thus do not record it in the PEMA dataset. To further illustrate this, Table 2 reports the exact wording of UNSC resolution paragraphs that either request peacekeepers to monitor, assist or secure disarmament and demobilization or encourage engagement with this task.

The second set of variables indicates whether the resolution stipulates a complete adjustment of the mandate, a minor adjustment, or a simple extension of the mission. We code a complete adjustment when a new peacekeeping operation is first authorized or when at least one new task is added or dropped. Often, the resolution makes this change explicit by stating that "from the resolution onwards, [the peacekeeping operation] shall have the following mandate." We code a minor adjustment when there is a change in the requested modality of engagement or the strength of the mandate provision, but no new tasks are added.

Table 2. Coding examples.

		Strength of mandate provision	
Modality of engagement		<i>Requested</i>	<i>Encouraged</i>
	<i>Monitoring</i>	Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) [...] by monitoring the disarmament process <sup>11</sup>	Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan [...] [to] support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts <sup>12</sup>
	<i>Assisting</i>	Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative [...] who shall [...] coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration <sup>13</sup>	
	<i>Securing</i>	To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme <sup>14</sup>	

Security Council resolutions commonly include provisions that are not directly related to peacekeepers' tasks. Three types of such provisions are excluded from our data. First, we do not code tasks that the Council requests from entities other than the mission. For example, in Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, the Council requested the UN Secretary-General rather than the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda to undertake efforts to support an arms embargo committee. Second, we do not code tasks based on the expected outcome. For example, if a resolution requests a mission to assist with the re-establishment of state authority in order to enable economic recovery, we code only assistance to state authority and not economic recovery, unless the resolution requests peacekeepers to assist with economic recovery elsewhere in the same resolution. Third, we exclude vague references that lack clearly identifiable tasks, the "welcoming" of progress and ongoing tasks, and references to the

<sup>11</sup> MONUC, S/RES/1756, §2n.

<sup>12</sup> MINUSMA, S/RES/2100, §11.

<sup>13</sup> UNMISS, S/RES/2057, §19.

<sup>14</sup> UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289, §10c.

capacities needed to carry out certain tasks. More details on the coding procedure are available in the Codebook.

## **Patterns in the Data: Variation in Mandates Across and Within Missions**

This section provides a descriptive overview of peacekeeping mandates using the PEMA data. It introduces some key patterns of variation and illustrates the heterogeneity that exists in UN peacekeeping mandates, both across and within missions. Despite the frequent criticism that peacekeeping mandates are very similar and follow a template approach (UN 2015; Ruggeri et al. 2013; Howard and Dayal 2018), a closer inspection reveals considerable variation.

Figure 1 exhibits the mandated tasks of the missions in the sample, as coded *at the outset* of each mission. Mandated tasks are marked as present (dark grey) if the relevant resolution included any modality of engagement in these tasks. Even this fairly simple overview allows us to corroborate three key patterns discussed in the literature on peacekeeping. First, there has been considerable growth in the scope of UN mandates. The five oldest missions in the sample, established in the early 1990s, included an average of 5.8 tasks per mandate, considerably fewer than the average of 20.8 tasks for five missions established in the 2010s. This trend reflects the widening expectations placed on UN missions by the Security Council.

Second, we observe an expansion of mandates into new areas. Most clearly, this is reflected in the growth of tasks relating to enhancing state capacity, reconciliation, and economic development. None of the earlier missions in the sample were requested to carry out these tasks, but in the 2000s and the 2010s, such tasks were present in the majority of newly launched missions. While researchers have already noted the expansion of mandates into new areas (Gizelis et al. 2016), our data present a systematic picture of how it has evolved, across specific missions and tasks, resolution by resolution.

Third, we observe a trend towards the disaggregation of tasks within broader policy areas. For example, what was previously described as “security sector reform”<sup>15</sup> has become divided into a series of more specified tasks, such as “military reform” and “police reform,” which are not

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<sup>15</sup> For example, the 2003 resolution adjusting the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) encouraged the mission to provide assistance “for the reform of the security forces” (MONUC, S/RES/1493, §5).



always mandated simultaneously.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, security sector reform can also be coupled with related tasks like “justice reform” and “prison reform” in some recent resolutions. Importantly, our data allow us to identify whether the much-discussed expansion of peacekeeping mandates is mostly attributable to the disaggregation of older tasks or the addition of completely new tasks.


Since the PEMA dataset is structured as panel data, with multiple observations on each mission over time, it allows us to track the evolution of specific mandates. This may be particularly relevant for researchers carrying out single-mission case studies or investigating mission-specific patterns, but it may also be useful for researchers considering variation in the longitudinal impact of missions.

As an illustration of how the PEMA dataset incorporates mission-specific data, Figure 2 shows the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), established in 1999 as the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and since 2010 known as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Resolution S/RES/1925 marks the beginning of MONUSCO.


We observe the nuanced picture of peacekeeping mandate evolution that the PEMA data make possible. In the case of MONUC/MONUSCO, the mandate has evolved over six phases. In the first short phase, it was a small liaison mission with a few core tasks, most centrally assistance with ceasefire observation. The second phase, starting in early 2000, saw the establishment of a larger mission with a wider mandate, including reconciliation and DDR. With some smaller modifications, this mandate remained the same in 2003, which ushered in the third phase. Following the signing of the Sun City Agreement and the beginning of the political transition period, MONUC saw its force increased and its mandate expanded to include yet more tasks, including support to the electoral process, state capacity, and arms embargo monitoring.

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<sup>16</sup> To accurately reflect this disaggregation in our dataset, when a resolution mentions “security sector reform,” we code for both military and police reform.



**Figure 1.** Mandate specification at mission establishment. Missions ordered chronologically.



**Figure 2.** *Mandate of MONUC & MONUSCO (1999-2017).*

In 2004, the fourth phase saw an increase in troops and another widening of the mandate, now crucially also including offensive operations. After the 2006 elections, the fifth phase that began in 2007 implied that some previous tasks, such as assistance for legal reform, were discontinued, whereas tasks relating to reconciliation, public information, and civil society were added, reflecting the mission's increasingly multidimensional profile.<sup>17</sup> The sixth and final phase saw the initiation of a reduction of the mission's mandate and strength, starting in 2016.

This brief description underlines the importance of having mandate data that can be temporally disaggregated. It is clear that MONUC, as established in 1999, was a very different operation

<sup>17</sup> The change from MONUC to MONUSCO was not associated with significant changes to the mandate.

from MONUC of 2004 or MONUSCO of 2017. These changes reflect the Security Council's evaluation of the mission's changing political and military environment, as well as the general evolution of UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice. Thus, the MONUC/MONUSCO example clearly illustrates the potential pitfalls of overlooking the dynamic nature of peacekeeping missions and basing research on simplified measures of mandates or, even more problematically, overlooking them entirely.

## **Research Avenues Opened by the PEMA Dataset**

The PEMA dataset opens two principal avenues for research. The first avenue looks at peacekeeping *as an instrument of conflict resolution*. Studies have started evaluating whether specific mandated tasks affect missions' performance. Murdie (2017) argues that mandates that focus on humanitarian assistance or protection of civilians improve the human rights situation in the host country. Heldt (2011) contends that mandates with democracy-related provisions enable peacekeepers to contribute to democratization. We recognize that peacekeepers do not always fulfill all the tasks assigned to them. It is an important question in itself whether and when peacekeeping missions actually implement their mandates (Blair et al. 2020). We also recognize that peacekeepers can engage in activities not mentioned in the mandate on their own initiative. However, mandates serve as an important source of legitimation for peacekeepers' activities within the mission, in the eyes of host state counterparts, and among member states who support peacekeeping politically or materially. The data on mandates could therefore be used in conjunction with data on actual activities of peacekeeping missions. Studies already exist that use data on peacekeeping activities, as reported by the UN (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013; Smidt 2020). Looking at how peacekeeping tasks, both mandated and implemented, influence peacekeeping outcomes is a fruitful avenue for research within the growing literature on the effects and legacies of peacekeeping operations (e.g., Gledhill 2020).

The second avenue looks at peacekeeping *as an international institution*. Peacekeeping mandate negotiations are a site of global power struggles, with the five permanent members of the Security Council, the elected members, and non-state actors vying for influence. Since the UNSC is the embodiment of a great power concert, studying its approach to mandates can reveal international society's normative priorities, which could signal, for example, decreasing emphasis on democratization but a greater concern with environmental protection. Scholars who study the evolution of specific mandate provisions over time, such as human rights

(Katayanagi 2002; Månsson 2006), security sector reform (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008), protection of civilians (Mamiya 2016), protection of children (Bode 2018), gender mainstreaming (Karim and Beardsley 2017), public information and strategic communications (Oksamytna 2018), or environmental protection (Maertens 2019), could benefit from a comprehensive overview of this evolution across and within peacekeeping missions. Studies could also investigate internal factors (UNSC composition and power differentials or members' foreign policies and relations with the host government) and external pressures (civil society activism or media attention) shaping the Council's approach to mandated tasks. Studies could investigate the UN Secretariat's reactions to the expansion and disaggregation of mandates to complement recent research on UN officials' role at the mandate formulation stage (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2020). Furthermore, investigating whether peacekeeping budgets have kept pace with mandate expansion could add to the growing body of research on the politics of financing international organization (e.g., Patz and Goetz 2019).

While these two avenues for further research are our suggestions on how the PEMA data can be used, they are not exhaustive. We can also imagine that the data can be useful for comparative research on international organizations. Many international organizations have also experienced an expansion of their tasks and the approach taken here should be replicable in research on other institutions and other issue areas. For example, the International Monetary Fund has been tasked with monitoring a growing list of conditions in its agreements with borrowers, which currently include twenty policy areas, such as central bank reform or privatization (e.g., Dreher et al. 2015). The PEMA dataset will therefore be useful for a diverse category of International Relations scholars.

### **Re-examination of Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013)**

To further illustrate the value of the PEMA data, we replicate the study by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013; henceforth HKS) on the effects of peacekeeping deployments on civilian victimization, using the exact same model specifications, data sources and sample as HKS and then adding measures of civilian protection mandates from our PEMA dataset. As one of the first studies to systematically assess the UN's ability to deliver on a headline ambition, the HKS article has been influential in the peacekeeping literature. HKS argue that peacekeepers can mitigate violence against civilians by altering belligerents' incentives and by physically

shielding civilians from attack. Peacekeepers' ability to do so, HKS argue, depends on the size and composition of the force across the categories of troops, police, and military observers.

The key contribution of HKS concerns the importance of missions' size and composition. While HKS mention the potential relevance of mandates, the lack of available data limited their ability to provide a detailed test of how mandates can support protection of civilians. They use two dummy variables coding robust mandates or Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates. The latter is coded as 1 if the mandate refers to POC. HKS are not explicit about which resolutions they code, but comparing their coding of POC to PEMA's coding, it seems that only the initial resolutions authorizing a mission were coded to identify POC mandates. This means that, for example, missions such as the UN operations in Burundi or Rwanda are not coded as POC missions, even though they had such mandates during considerable portions of their lifetimes but not at the point of authorization. Also, a request to actively protect civilians or an instruction to merely monitor their situation would likely affect peacekeepers' resolve in stopping civilian victimization differently. Whether a UN force has the ability to reduce civilian victimization, after all, depends on its size and composition, but also very likely on *whether* and *how* the mission is specifically mandated to pursue this objective.

To evaluate the impact of mandates and demonstrate the utility of our data, we re-evaluate and extend HKS. We use an identical, multivariate research design to examine variation in the count of civilians killed in a conflict month as a function of a set of independent variables. Like HKS, we use a negative binomial estimator on their sample of all intrastate armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2008 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; Melander and Sundberg 2013). We replicate the main specification without fixed-effects, as in the original HKS article, but as the authors, we also provide robustness models including conflict fixed-effects in the Appendix (Tables A.4-A.6). The HKS data covers 20 peacekeeping missions, 18 of which are included in our dataset.<sup>18</sup>


Beyond the HKS variables, which are exactly as in the original study, we enter three types of mandate variables. The first, *POC mandate*, has the same logic as the POC measure in HKS – it is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a mandate includes POC tasks where peacekeepers either help the government in protecting civilians or are requested to carry out POC without

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<sup>18</sup> BINUB in Burundi and UNOA in Angola are not coded in PEMA because these are Special Political Missions.

any reference to the government's support. Second, we disaggregate the POC dummy into *POC active* and *POC passive* types. The former is identical to the first POC mandate dummy (i.e., the mission protects civilians alone or in coordination with the government), while the latter means that POC is only encouraged or requested as a monitoring task by the UNSC.

To facilitate comparison, we report coefficient plots with estimates across different models; full tables are available in the Appendix. We begin with negative binomial models of the sum of civilian killings in a given conflict-month. Coefficients in Figure 3 largely confirm the HKS finding that the size of missions matters and so does a mandate to protect civilians. Indeed, the estimated coefficient of HKS POC dummy and ours are virtually identical and associated with fewer civilian deaths. Interestingly, when disaggregating passive and active POC mandates, the violence-reduction effect is largely due to active POC provisions.



**Figure 3.** Coefficient Plot from Table A.1 (Appendix).

In Figure 4, we follow HKS in disaggregating violence against civilians as perpetrated by either rebels or the government. When focusing on rebels (top panel, Figure 4), we see that mandates are largely irrelevant in explaining missions' capacity to protect civilians. Except for active POC that is weakly associated with less OSV ( $p\text{-value} < 0.1$ ), peacekeeping missions seem to effectively deter rebel violence only via large military deployments. The literature on peacekeeping effectiveness has proposed deterrence and signaling as key mechanisms of

missions' success (e.g., Ruggeri et al. 2017; Fjelde et al. 2019). It is possible that rebels are more likely to be deterred and refrain from using violence when they are confronted with a large military deployment, regardless of the specificities of its mandate. Indeed, rebels may be undeterred even by strong POC mandates if they do not understand the subtleties of the legal formulas in UNSC resolutions or are unaware of the mandate altogether, especially at lower levels of the chain of command. Conversely, a visible presence of a sizeable military contingent sends a clear and unambiguous message. Governments, on the other hand, may behave differently, not the least because they, as mission hosts, are likely to be more aware of mandate specificities.

The centrality of mandates in the mission-host state relation is mirrored in the findings in the bottom panel in Figure 4, where we focus on government-sponsored violence against civilians. First, we find that the size of the deployment is irrelevant to missions' ability to protect civilians against violence perpetrated by the government. Second, POC provisions in mandates now largely explain the violence-curbing effect of peacekeeping. In particular, POC mandates decrease violence against civilians perpetrated by the government, but only if mandated with active POC. This means there are two scenarios under which a peacekeeping mission is effective at preventing civilian victimization by government forces: when it has the authorization to act alone to stop it or when it is instructed to assist the host government in protecting civilians, which implies a cooperative relationship with local army and police. This relationship can both increase the capacity of national security actors and allow peacekeepers to advocate against abusive behavior by local partners. By contrast, passive POC mandates that involve monitoring others' protection activities or simply encourage the mission to engage in POC are likely to exacerbate violence against civilians by the government. It is plausible that the mechanism linking passive POC to increases in civilian victimization is similar to the HKS's finding showing that UN observers, who lack military capacity, are associated with more civilian deaths. This is because the deployment of observers, probably like passive POC provisions, signals the possibility that more robust actions will be implemented soon, hence pushing parties to escalate and consolidate their advantage.

In their extended tests, HKS carries out a matching study, pairing up civil wars with PKOs (treated) with civil wars without PKOs (untreated), finding results that align with their main regression results. Since it is not meaningful to match on a variable with many values – like our POC variables – in a limited sample, we do not replicate this extension. Furthermore, we




do not believe that the direction of the bias due to non-random assignment of mandates is clear-cut.<sup>19</sup> Notably, HKS' matching results are not substantially different from the non-matching results, hence reducing concerns about covariates' imbalance biasing the results.

These results do not undermine the general validity of HKS findings but clearly illustrate how the nature of peacekeeping mandates shapes the UN's ability to diminish civilian victimization, depending on who perpetrates the violence. Governments and rebels engage with peacekeeping operations in different ways, and their incentives to cooperate with the mission differ. For rebels, size matters more than the mandate, but this is not the case for host governments. Our re-evaluation and extension of HKS thus demonstrate that the ability to incorporate nuanced data on mandates is an important development in peacekeeping research not only for empirical reasons, but also for our understanding of *how* peacekeeping works. This is especially valuable in light of the recent interest in the nuanced mechanism through which peacekeeping operations produce effects through persuasion, inducement, or deterrence (Howard 2019; Hultman et al. 2019; Bove et al. 2020). Absent disaggregated mandate data, scholars run the risk of exaggerating the effects of variables or underplay the importance of different actors with whom peacekeeping missions deal.

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<sup>19</sup> On the one hand, POC mandates, like robust mandates, are more likely in conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians (Hultman 2013). On the other hand, governments that perpetrate violence against civilians are more likely to oppose a POC mandate, which might make the UNSC more reluctant to assign it. However, as we describe below, POC is often authorized by the UNSC even without the government's support. Thus, while the direction of the bias is not clear, future research will be able to leverage PEMA's level of details to shed light on the mission-host government dynamics, explaining how these factor into peacekeeping mandate negotiations.



**Figure 4.** *Coefficient Plot from Table A.2 (top panel) and A.3 (bottom panel). Tables in Appendix.*

Viewed independently, the finding that mandates matter underlines the importance of the UNSC thinking carefully about the formulation of mandates. If POC is part of the Council's ambition, it must ensure that this is reflected in clearly formulated mandates, and that POC, if possible, is requested at the most demanding modality of engagement, i.e., assisting local security actors or providing security for protection of civilians.

## Conclusion

The Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset covers initial and revised mandates of 27 peacekeeping missions in Africa in the 1991-2017 period. It codes 39 tasks at three modalities of engagement, specifying whether a mission is instructed to monitor, assist, or secure the task. The data also record whether the mandate requests or merely encourages engagement in a given task. It therefore goes beyond any of the existing efforts to classify or code peacekeeping tasks in terms of its detail and coverage.

The descriptive patterns in the data clearly show the expansion, diversification, and increasing granularity of peacekeeping provisions in UNSC resolutions. They demonstrate heterogeneity in UN peacekeeping mandates across and within missions, which challenges the widely held assumption that mandate design follows a template approach. They also point to the importance of analyzing not only initial but also revised mandates, considering that some missions last for decades and experience significant alterations of their role and purpose.

Our re-evaluation and extension of Hultman et al. (2013) illustrates the research utility that flows from having highly disaggregated mandate data. We show that mandate design has important implications for the UN's ability to decrease violence against civilians. While the peacekeeping force's size and composition do matter, as Hultman et al. argue, the addition of finely disaggregated mandate data reveals two new findings. First, missions' ability to minimize violence against the local population is strengthened only when they are mandated to engage in active protection of civilians, as opposed to passive modalities of engagement. Second, the effect of such mandates varies across potential perpetrators. Whereas violence against civilians by rebel groups appears to be unaffected by stronger mandates, civilian victimization by the government is more sensitive to nuances in the mandate language. These results indicate that disaggregated mandate data can help identify the conditions under which peacekeepers can prevent and mitigate violence against civilians and address other problems they are deployed to ameliorate.

We have identified two major research avenues based on the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset. The first avenue is the analysis of peacekeeping as an instrument of conflict resolution. It entails focusing on how mandates strengthen peacekeepers' resolve and translate into peacekeeping activities and outcomes on the ground. The second avenue is the study of UN

peacekeepers as an international institution. It entails analyzing how peacekeeping resolutions reflect the priorities of, and frictions within, the international community. The Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset will be useful to scholars working in the fields of international security, peace studies, international organizations, and foreign policy.

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## Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset

### Online Appendix

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## Tables with Full Models

Table A.1. Negative Binomial Models; DV: All One-Sided Violence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
HKS POC 0/1	-0.479** (0.192)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.503** (0.197)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.303 (0.225)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.602*** (0.215)
UN Troops	-0.081** (0.034)	-0.077** (0.034)	-0.068** (0.034)
UN Police	0.380 (0.428)	0.231 (0.445)	-0.033 (0.497)
UN observers	0.958* (0.531)	1.139** (0.568)	1.097* (0.579)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
OSV (all)	2.070*** (0.084)	2.078*** (0.084)	2.071*** (0.084)
Incompatibility	0.741*** (0.127)	0.726*** (0.126)	0.741*** (0.127)
Episode Duration	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Population (log)	0.359*** (0.047)	0.347*** (0.046)	0.356*** (0.046)
Observations	3746	3746	3746
AIC	11392.388	11392.019	11392.216
BIC	11467.129	11466.760	11473.186

\* 0.10 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01

Table A.2. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Rebels One-Sided Violence

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
HKS POC 0/1	-0.329 (0.208)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.350* (0.210)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.290 (0.255)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.428* (0.225)
UN Troops	-0.084** (0.035)	-0.083** (0.035)	-0.075** (0.036)
UN Police	0.350 (0.458)	0.294 (0.466)	0.046 (0.526)
UN observers	0.939* (0.565)	1.020* (0.583)	0.970 (0.593)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)
Rebels OSV	2.174*** (0.098)	2.173*** (0.098)	2.170*** (0.098)
Government OSV	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Incompatibility	0.619*** (0.221)	0.619*** (0.221)	0.628*** (0.221)
Episode Duration	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Population (log)	0.150*** (0.058)	0.147** (0.057)	0.153*** (0.057)
Observations	3746	3746	3746
AIC	8103.900	8103.596	8104.312
BIC	8191.098	8190.795	8197.739

\* 0.10 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01

Table A.3. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Government One-Sided Violence

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
HKS POC 0/1	-1.498*** (0.347)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.703** (0.298)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			1.651*** (0.341)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-1.149*** (0.355)
UN Troops	-0.073 (0.053)	-0.072 (0.051)	-0.036 (0.048)
UN Police	1.332** (0.627)	1.405** (0.597)	0.158 (0.724)
UN observers	2.026** (0.888)	0.839 (0.854)	0.383 (0.943)
Battle-Deaths (side B)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Rebels OSV	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Incompatibility	1.242*** (0.165)	1.168*** (0.164)	1.223*** (0.163)
Episode Duration	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.989*** (0.074)	0.946*** (0.074)	0.977*** (0.073)
Observations	3746	3746	3746
AIC	6166.550	6183.216	6159.768
BIC	6247.519	6264.186	6246.966

\* 0.10 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01

## Tables with Fixed-Effects Models

Table A.4. Negative Binomial Models; DV: All One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects.

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
HKS POC 0/1	-0.432** (0.189)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.475** (0.194)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.322 (0.223)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.579*** (0.212)
UN Troops	-0.084** (0.033)	-0.080** (0.033)	-0.072** (0.034)
UN Police	0.426 (0.422)	0.273 (0.439)	0.008 (0.487)
UN observers	0.918* (0.521)	1.127** (0.557)	1.073* (0.570)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
OSV (all)	1.990*** (0.082)	1.997*** (0.082)	1.989*** (0.082)
Incompatibility	0.703*** (0.129)	0.691*** (0.129)	0.708*** (0.129)
Episode Duration	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Population (log)	0.330*** (0.049)	0.318*** (0.048)	0.328*** (0.048)
Observations	3264.000	3264.000	3264.000
AIC	10881.147	10880.244	10880.170
BIC	10942.054	10941.151	10947.168
Conflict FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Std. Err. clustered by Conflict			
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01			

Table A.5. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Rebels One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects.

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
HKS POC 0/1	-0.321 (0.208)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.344 (0.210)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.298 (0.254)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.423* (0.224)
UN Troops	-0.085** (0.035)	-0.083** (0.035)	-0.075** (0.036)
UN Police	0.357 (0.456)	0.299 (0.465)	0.047 (0.524)
UN observers	0.940* (0.563)	1.023* (0.581)	0.971 (0.591)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)
Rebels OSV	2.154*** (0.097)	2.153*** (0.097)	2.149*** (0.097)
Government OSV	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Incompatibility	0.556** (0.217)	0.556** (0.217)	0.566*** (0.217)
Episode Duration	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Population (log)	0.148** (0.058)	0.145** (0.057)	0.151*** (0.057)
Observations	2498	2498	2498
AIC	7725.592	7725.256	7725.888
BIC	7795.471	7795.135	7801.590
Conflict FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Std. Err. clustered by Conflict

\* 0.10 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01



Table A.6. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Government One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects.

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
HKS POC 0/1	-1.564*** (0.353)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.755** (0.302)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			1.644*** (0.345)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-1.194*** (0.361)
UN Troops	-0.091 (0.058)	-0.085 (0.055)	-0.041 (0.050)
UN Police	1.530** (0.680)	1.539** (0.635)	0.183 (0.757)
UN observers	2.235** (0.913)	1.017 (0.881)	0.532 (0.959)
Battle-Deaths (side B)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Rebels OSV	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Incompatibility	1.270*** (0.167)	1.191*** (0.167)	1.248*** (0.166)
Episode Duration	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.971*** (0.076)	0.922*** (0.076)	0.955*** (0.075)
Observations	3063	3063	3063.
AIC	5719.267	5736.557	5714.043
BIC	5785.566	5802.856	5786.368
Conflict FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Std. Err. clustered by Conflict

\* 0.10 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01

## **Codebook for the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset**

This document sets out the coding criteria used to collect data on the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) resolutions that authorize, extend or modify the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) from 1991-2017. The 27 missions currently included are (in alphabetic order) MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMIS, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, UNOMUR, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II.

We code a comprehensive list of tasks or policy areas that the PKO is mandated to do.

We code the following tasks:

1. Disarmament & Demobilization
2. Reintegration
3. Control of small arms and light weapons (SALW)
4. Demilitarization
5. Arms Embargo
6. Civilian Protection
7. Human Rights
8. Child Rights
9. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
10. Police Reform
11. Military Reform
12. Offensive Operations
13. Justice Sector Reform
14. Transitional Justice
15. Prison Reform
16. Border Control
17. Demining
18. Resources
19. State Authority Extension
20. Democratization
21. Electoral Security
22. Electoral Assistance

23. Voter Education
24. Political Party Assistance
25. Civil Society Assistance
26. Media
27. Power Sharing
28. Reconciliation
29. Local Reconciliation
30. Regional Reconciliation
31. Economic Development
32. Humanitarian Relief
33. Public Health
34. Refugee Assistance
35. Gender
36. Legal Reform
37. Ceasefire
38. Peace Agreement
39. Use of Force

Conceptually, we code both a) the modality of PKO engagement (monitoring, assisting and securing) and b) the strength of the UNSC request (requesting and encouraging). The table below clarifies this conceptualization:

		Strength of mandate provision	
		Requested	Encouraged
Modality of engagement	Monitoring	Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) [...] by monitoring the disarmament process <sup>20</sup>	Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan [...] [to] support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts <sup>21</sup>
	Assisting	Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative [...] who shall [...] coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, including in the field of	

<sup>20</sup> MONUC, S/RES/1756, §2n.

<sup>21</sup> MINUSMA, S/RES/2100, §11.

		Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration <sup>22</sup>	
	Securing	To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme <sup>23</sup>	

There are three modalities of engagement that can be mandated by the Security Council to the mission. We call those engagement categories. All three modalities of PKO engagement can occur if the strength of UNSC request is “requesting” rather than “encouraging” the PKO to do something.

- **Monitoring:** It includes tasks related to engagement of peacekeepers as observers of compliance and/or implementation. Good indicators for mandated **monitoring tasks** are sentences that start with *request the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / approves the PKO will / **monitor / report / observe / verify / establish an early warning system / follow-up** etc.*
- **Assisting:** It includes active involvement of the mission personnel, **including coordination of activities and support for implementation of policies**. In this category, peacekeepers can both implement and carry out the tasks autonomously or help the government to engage in a task (including by providing good offices). Thus, we also code PKO activities if the mandate states that the government shall do an activity (e.g. small arms control), with the support of the PKO (see example under *Control Small Arms and Light Weapons, i.e. ControlSALW*). The level of engagement is thus higher than Monitoring. A good indicator for mandated **assistance activities** are sentences that starts with requests *the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / approves the PKO will **assist in the task X or support the government in carrying out the task X***. We also code assistance activities if the resolution says that “the mandate of PKO states that PKO will assist [the task X]” or that it “*encourages the government to work with the PKO*”. We do not take the phrase “liaise with the government” as indicator of assistance.
- **Security provision:** It includes tasks in which peacekeepers provide security in the context of one of the mandated activities. A good indicator for mandated **security activities** are sentences that start with request *the PKO to / decides that the PKO should*

<sup>22</sup> UNMISS, S/RES/2057, §19.

<sup>23</sup> UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289, §10c.

*/ approves the PKO will **help establish a secure humanitarian corridor/environment, provide security for X, secure** and similar phrases.*

In some case, the mandate does not request to carry out a specific task, but it encourages the engagement in the activity. We capture these instances with the encouragement modality. If the UNSC encourages the PKO to do something, then we do not distinguish between the different modalities of engagement but only code the type of task that is encouraged by the UNSC:

- Encourage: A good indicator for **encouraged activities** are sentences that start with *encourages / urges / calls upon / emphasize need to consider* etc. We do not code praise for past activities of the mission, e.g. if the Secretary General *expresses its appreciation / commends / welcomes / expresses its support / endorses etc.* an activity. While monitor and assist relate to the missions' degree of engagement in the activities, encourage relates to the degree of obligation to fulfil the mandated activities (independent of whether they are monitor or assistance).

#### **Important notes:**

**We also code tasks that are mandated *conditionally*** because they indicate that the UNSC is authorizing the mission to perform them to some extent. For example, we code *Arms Embarg\_*: *Monitor* here:

*"Requests the Government of Sudan and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to propose by 20 July modalities for implementation of the 29 June agreement on border monitoring, and in case the parties fail to do so, requests UNMISS to observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms, and related materiel across the border with Sudan" (S/RES/1996, 2011).*

**We only code tasks that the UNSC mandates for the PKO or the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General because the latter is the mission's head. We do not code** task mandated to any other entity, neither the Secretary General nor other UN agencies (e.g. UNDP).

*"Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict" (S/RES/918, 1994). **Here we do not code 'Transitional Justice: Monitor' because the UNSC resolution mandates the Secretary General rather than the PKO***

**We do not code** monitoring activities that are directed at international rather than domestic actors and when it is not clear from the text that the UN PKO must actively do something to monitor / gather information on the peacebuilding policy. For example, we **do not** code any monitoring activity for the paragraph below because the monitoring is directed at the “United Nations system support” rather than domestic actors or efforts.

*“We reiterates its request that UNMISS report back to the Council on a plan for United Nations system support in this regard and update the Council through the Secretary-General’s regular reports on progress of United Nations system support to specific peacebuilding tasks, especially security sector reform, police institutional development, rule of law and justice sector support, human rights capacity-building, early recovery, formulation of national policies related to key issues of state building and development, and establishing the conditions for development, consistent with national priorities and with a view to contributing to the development of a common framework for monitoring progress in these areas” (S/RES/2109, 2013).*

We **do not** code requests to the UNSG to report on progresses made toward the implementation of the mandate (usually found at the end of the resolution). For example, it is common to have paragraphs starting “Requests the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council every 90 days on progress made towards implementing UNAMID’s mandate” followed by a long list of policy areas. None is coded since this reporting has the mission itself as target.

**We do not code** phrases that merely states the importance or priorities of the mission, such as “reiterates that the PKO should” or if the resolution “stresses the importance of” or “reaffirms [task] should be a priority”.

**We do not code** expected outcomes of a task. An example from a MONUSCO resolution is the following:

*“Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, to build on the Government’s STAREC and revised ISSSS to support the establishment of a minimum level of sustainable state authority and control in conflict-affected areas in eastern DRC, including through area-based efforts to improve security, state authority and enable the commencement of sustainable socio-economic recovery” (S/RES/2098, 2013). **The only task coded from this paragraph from the MONUSCO resolution is assistance to state authority (State Authority: Assist); but there is***

*no evidence of assistance to economic development (Economic Development: Assist) as an explicit task for the mission. Economic development is just the expected outcome.*

*“Assisting also in the ongoing political process in Somalia, which should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government” (S/RES/897, 1994).*

*The paragraph from an UNOSOM II resolution should not be coded as election assistance task (ElectionAssistance\_Assist) as it indicates the expected outcome of a task generally related to support for the political process.*

**We do not code** activities related to the content of the peace agreement.

*“To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General” (S/RES/872, 1993). This is not coded.*

**We do not code** ‘Welcoming’ of progress or activities.

*“Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children by the FARDC” (S/RES/2277, 2016).*

**We do not code** vague references to state-building, early recovery, widening popular participation, and effective governance.

*“[S]trengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically” (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is not coded.*

**We do not code** references to the capacity to perform tasks or requests concerning the composition and planning of the mission, as well as coordination with other external actors (states, IOs, NGOs or UN agencies). For example, we do not code requests to contribute to the mission (financially and with personnel) or the following request for UNMISS to deploy:

*“[A]ppropriate civilian component, including technical human rights investigation expertise” (S/RES/1996, 2011).*

*“Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel referred to above; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution” (S/RES/997, 1995). **This is not coded.***

**We do not code** requests to fill vacancies such as the following:

*“Requests the Secretary-General to ensure all human rights monitoring positions within UNAMSIL are filled in order to address the concerns raised in paragraphs 44 to 51 of the report of the Secretary-General” (S/RES/1346, 2001).*

The description of each field below further specifies other less general instances that we do not code.

### **Coding system**

We record the exact paragraph number as evidence. For example, if paragraph 4 and paragraph 4a(i) contain evidence for ‘Civilian Protection: Assist’, then we record “4, 4a(ii)” in the variable field in the excel spreadsheet. If the paragraph is not numbered, we use page number (e.g. p5).

We code the following variables.

### **Signature**

The resolution code as usually indicated in the left corner of each document. For example: S/RES/1000.

### **Year**

The year the resolution was passed, usually indicated in the left corner of each document or the title. For example: 2000.

### **Date**

The full date the resolution was passed, usually indicated in the left corner of each document. For example: 1/1/2000. The format is dd/mm/yyyy.

### **PKO\_Name**

The acronym of the mission the resolution refers to. For example: UNMIL. The acronym is missing if the resolution is not specifically on a mission’s mandate but includes some potential tasks for the mission. Resolutions on arms embargoes, for example, may include tasks for a mission if deployed. When these resolutions are coded, the PKO\_Name field is empty.



### **Mandate\_Renewal**

This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution extends the duration of the mission, that is, if it is not establishing a new mission. It takes value 0 otherwise, including when the resolution authorizes a mission for the first time. Note that first resolution of all missions records 0 on all the three Mandate variables. If there is no evidence on whether this mandate is a renewal or not, then we **do not** code anything. Note that when a mission is renewed, we only code renewal instead of copy-pasting all the tasks originally mandated.

### **Mandate\_MinorAdjustment**

This variable takes value 1 if the resolution modifies the mandate, usually adding new tasks. It takes value 0 otherwise. In most cases, resolutions list tasks that are probably new so oftentimes both *MinorAdjustment* and *Renewal* take value 1. For missions authorized for the first time, both variables are 0. This also holds for new missions that directly proceed already established UN missions, e.g. UNAMIR after UNOMUR is a new mission (*Mandate\_Renewal* = 0; *Mandate\_MinorAdjustment* = 0, *Mandate\_CompleteAdjustment* = 0). Changes in deployment levels (e.g. size of the mission) are not coded as Adjustments. Note that when coding a *MinorAdjustment*, only new tasks are added; tasks that are still mandated but already coded in the previous resolution are not added.

### **Mandate\_CompleteAdjustment**

This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution gives a completely new mandate to the mission. Often, the resolution also explicitly states this, for example, by stating that “from the resolution onwards [the PKO] shall have the following mandate to prioritize the following tasks ...”. A completely new mandate requires new activities to be added or new activities to be dropped in addition to a comprehensive set of activities to be mandated. If not explicitly mentioned, we infer complete adjustments when a substantial number of new fields are added or dropped from previous resolutions. Note that when a coding a *CompleteAdjustment*, we code all tasks included in the adjusted mandate (differently from *MinorAdjustment* where only new tasks are coded).

*“Decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), requests the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MINUSMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, further decides that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, for an initial period of 12 months...” (S/RES/2100, 2013). We code **Mandate\_Renewal = 0 and Mandate\_MinorAdjustment = 0 and Mandate\_CompleteAdjustment = 0.***

**The list of variables below refers to distinct policy fields peacekeepers can be mandated with.** As mentioned, peacekeepers activity in each policy field can involve three levels of engagement namely *Monitoring*, *Assistance*, and/or *Providing Security*. Notice that these levels of engagement are not exclusive. When the UNSC is not requesting any of these levels of engagement but only encouraging mission's involvement, the policy is coded as *Encouraged*.

Below is an example of the how *Monitoring*, *Assistance*, *Security Provision* or *Encouragement* are mandated in the context of "Disarmament & Demobilization".

- UNOMIL, S/RES/866 1993: *"To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement [...] in particular to assist in the monitoring of the compliance with the [...] disarmament and demobilization of combatants"* → **Monitoring**
- UNOMIL, S/RES/866 1993: *"To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of combatants"* → **Assistance**  
Or, MINUSMA, S/RES/2100 2013: *"Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission of MINUSMA who shall [...] coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)"* → **Assistance**
- UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289 2000: *"To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme"* → **Provision of Security**
- UNMISS, S/RES/2057 2012: *"...requests the Secretary-General to establish monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence, including rape in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict and other situations relevant to the implementation of resolution 1888 (2009), as appropriate, and encourages UNMISS as well as the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to actively address these issues."* → **Encouragement**

### **DisarmamentDemobilization**

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons *from combatants*. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups. If DDR is mentioned, then we code both DisarmamentDemobilization and Reintegration.

*“Calls upon the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to fully implement the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) strategy, to expedite the ongoing DDR program in a coherent manner, and requests UNMISS to work closely with the Government of South Sudan and in coordination with all relevant United Nations actors and other international partners in support of the DDR process”. (S/RES/2057, 2012). We code this as **DisarmamentDemobilization\_Assist (and also for Reintegration\_Assist)**.*

*“Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and participate in regional coordination and information mechanisms to improve protection of civilians and support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in light of the attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Republic of South Sudan” (S/RES/2057, 2012). We code this **DisarmamentDemobilization\_Encouraged (and also for Reintegration\_Encouraged)**.*

***This is not an example for DisarmamentDemobilization because the UN PKO activity shall be aimed at its own personnel:** “to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, including in particular those engaged in missions of observation, verification or DDRRR”. (S/RES/1493, 2003).*

When the Disarmament and Demobilization activities **only** refer to child soldier, we code this as *ChildRights only*. When DDR refers not only to but **also** to children/child soldiers, we code *DisarmamentDemobilization, Reintegration and ChildRights*.

*“Welcomes the progress made on the demobilization of child soldiers, and the signing of an action plan to end child recruitment by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on 12 March 2012 reaffirming the commitment to release all children from the SPLA, acknowledges the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to implement the action plan, calls for the further implementation of this action plan, requests UNMISS to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in this regard”. (S/RES/2109, 2013). We code **DisarmamentDemobilization\_Assist, Reintegration\_Assist and ChildRights\_Assist**.*

## **Reintegration**

Reintegration is the process in which ex-combatants turn into civilians; attempt to find employment; integrate into the national police/military. Reintegration can also include a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants. Reintegration is often part of disarmament and demobilization programs. But PKOs may be involved in disarmament and demobilization without

engaging in the reintegration process. If DDR is mentioned, then we code both *DisarmamentDemobilization* and *Reintegration*.

*“[U]rges the Government of the Central African Republic to fulfil these commitments, in particular: [...] To continue to implement with the support of MINURCA the demobilization and reintegration programme funded by UNDP” (S/RES/1230, 1999). This is coded as Reintegrations\_Assist.*

## **ControlSALW**

Control of small arms and light weapons (*ControlSALW*) refers to arms and weapons collection and storage programs that are sometimes conducted parallel to or after the conclusion of the disarmament and demobilisation process. Efforts to control SALW may also target specific groups in society, such as youth gangs, village elders, neighbourhood associations, defence councils, etc. They can also be mentioned together with the monitoring and assistance of an Arms Embargo. In contrast to *ArmsEmbargo* and *Demilitarization*, *ControlSALW* refers to management of weapons, including seizing weapons *outside of DDR programs*, collecting, storing and destroying them.

*“Calls for continued national efforts to address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO, as appropriate and within existing resources” (S/RES/2277, 2016). This is evidence for ControlSALW\_Assist.*

*“Requests UNMISS to observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms, and related materiel across the border with Sudan” (S/RES/2057, 2012). While the PKO is requested to monitor cross-border flows of arms, the monitoring does not take place as a result of an arms embargo. Therefore, we code ControlSALW\_Monitor rather than ArmsEmbargo\_Monitor.*

*“To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management”. (S/RES/2100, 2013). This is coded as ControlSALW\_Assist.*

*“to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel whose presence in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493, and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate”. (S/RES/1533, 2004). This is coded as ArmsEmbargo\_Assist and ControlSALW\_Assist.*

*“To continue to assist the national authorities, including the National Commission to fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collecting, registering, **securing** and disposing of weapons and in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate, in accordance with resolution 1980 (2011)” (S/RES/2000, 2011). **This is evidence for ControlSALW\_Security.***

**We do not code this because it is not explicitly about SALW, such as:**

*“To assist the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in monitoring the borders, with particular attention to any crossborder movement of combatants or transfer of arms and to the situation of Liberian refugees in close coordination with the United Nations Mission in Liberia” (S/RES/1933, 2010).*

### **Demilitarization**

Demilitarization refers to the withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from parts of the country. For example, the PKO in Angola monitored the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet troops, heavy weapons (grenade launchers), and tanks. In Cote d’Ivoire, the PKO maintained a buffer zone. In contrast to *ArmsEmbargo* and *ControlSALW*, *Demilitarization* indicates removal of weapons from specific areas, including temporary zones and strips. The following example is *ControlSALW* (seizing weapons within the area, which is not DDR site) and *Demilitarization* (establishing an area around Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites).

*“to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces; within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related matériel to the field, including to all armed groups” (S/RES/1291, 2000). **This is coded as Demilitarization\_Monitor:***

*“[S]tresses that such actions include, but are not limited to, within UNMISS’s capacity and areas of deployment, defending protection of civilians sites, establishing areas around the sites that are not used for hostile purposes by any forces, addressing threats to the sites, searching individuals attempting to enter the sites, and seizing weapons from those inside or attempting to enter the sites, removing from and denying entry of armed actors to the protection of civilians sites.” (S/RES/2406, 2018). **This is coded as Demilitarization\_Assist:***

*“To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city.” (S/RES/872, 1993). **This is coded as Demilitarization\_Security.***

### **ArmsEmbargo**

Arms embargo refers to international restrictions or bans on the import of weapons and technology that could be used to organise violence (e.g. arms embargo). In contrast to *ControlSALW* and *Demilitarization*, it is used if there is a reference to an arms embargo. For example, the paragraph below is coded as both *ArmsEmbargo\_Monitor* and *ArmsEmbargo\_Assist*.

*“Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2083 (2012) (S/RES/2100, 2013). **This is coded as ArmsEmbargo\_Monitor.***

*“Request the SG to support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992) utilizing as available and appropriate the UNSOM II forces authorized by this resolution and to report on this subject” (S/RES/814, 1993). **This is coded as ArmsEmbargo\_Assist.***

### **CivilianProtection**

The protection of civilians refers to strategies by UN troops, police, and civilian personnel to protect civilians from physical harm. *CivilianProtection\_Monitor* refers to mandated tasks which ask the PKO to monitor government-sponsored or its own protection efforts. *CivilianProtection\_Assist* refers to mandated task which ask the PKO to assist the government. *CivilianProtection\_Security* refers to PKO providing security for civilians without the government. We do not code civil disturbances here and we do not code references to general stabilization (unless civilian protection is mentioned).

*“[C]onduct regular reviews of its geographic deployment to ensure that its forces are best placed to protect civilians” (S/RES/2147, 2014). **This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Monitor.***

*“Collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population.” (S/RES/2112, 2013). **This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Monitor***

*“Requests MINUSMA to update its protection of civilians strategy, consistent with paragraph 19 (c) and (d) above and, in this regard, to identify threats to civilians, implement prevention*

*plans and accelerate the coordinated implementation of relevant monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements” (S/RES/2295, 2016). This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Monitor*

*“Advising and assisting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, including military and police at national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law” (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Assist.*

*“Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, **including through active patrolling**, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation;”. (S/RES/2147, 2014). This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Security.*

*“To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.” (UNAMIR S/1994/918, para. 3a). (S/RES/918, 1994). This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Security.*

*“Deterring violence including through proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is not providing such security” (S /RES/1996, 2011) This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Security.*

*“Authorizes UNMISS to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate as set out in resolution 1996 (2011), paragraphs 3 (b) (iv), 3 (b) (v), and 3 (b) (vi)” (S/RES/2057, 2012). This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Security. This is also coded as UseOfForce.*

*“[U]rges UNMISS to deploy its assets accordingly, and underscores the need for UNMISS to focus adequate attention on capacity-building efforts in this area, welcomes the development of a protection of civilians strategy and early warning and early response strategy.” (S/RES/2057, 2012) This is coded as CivilianProtection\_Encouraged.*

## **HumanRights**

Human rights activities should only be coded if the resolution mentions the phrase “human rights”.

*“Monitor, report and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including in the context of elections, and support the United Nations system in-country to ensure that any support provided by the United Nations shall be consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law as applicable;” (S/RES/2211, 2015). This is coded as **HumanRights\_Monitor**.*

*“Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;” (S/RES/1029, 1995). This is coded as **HumanRights\_Encouraged** because the Special Representative (part of the PKO) is mentioned.*

Importantly, *HumanRights* does not have a Security category because it already includes physical integrity. When mandates refer to protection of human rights activists/advocates, we use *CivilSocietyAssistance\_Security*. We **do not** code protection provided to human rights officers since these are part of UN personnel, which we never code.

## **ChildRights**

*ChildRights* refers to activities and policies designed to protect children from harm during or after armed conflict, including efforts to prevent recruitment of children into armed groups, to facilitate the reintegration of ex-child soldiers into their home communities, and to mitigate other forms of child abuse and neglect. We **do not** code *ChildRights* if the paragraph only refers to girls. This is why this policy area does not have a specific *Security* category.

*“To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and implementing programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children” (S/RES/2100, 2013). This is coded as **ChildRights\_Assist***

*“To exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the mission’s protection strategy, especially in regard to women and children, including to facilitate inter-communal reconciliation in areas of high risk of conflict as an essential part of long-term State-building activity;” (S/RES/2187, 2014). This is coded as **ChildRights\_Assist**.*



***We do not code this in this category:*** “To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity...” (S/RES/1528, 2004).

### **SGBViolence**

This is a special category of the human rights activity category. The paragraph needs to refer to sexual violence or gender-based violence (SGBV). If the paragraph only reports about sexual violence, **do not** code human rights. This should not include references to violations committed by UN PKO personnel. We infer from a reference to violence against women that the resolution is referring to gender-based violence.

*“To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict” (S/RES/2164, 2014). This is coded as SGBViolence\_Assist (reference to general needs) and SGBViolence\_Security (reference to protection).*

### **PoliceReform**

Police reform refers to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding police and other law enforcement institutions. This also includes instances of training programmes or coordinated operations involving the national police and the mission. If it is really not clear whether the agent is the police or military, then code under both *MilitaryReform* and *PoliceReform*. If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either police or military, then we code both police and military. We **do not** code *JusticeReform* unless it is specifically mentioned. Below is an example:

*“To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law” (S/RES/814, 1993). This is coded as PoliceReform\_Assist.*

Notice that here we **do not** code *JusticeSector* because it is aimed at international humanitarian law, not at domestic judicial structures. Also, we code *PoliceReform* in combination with *Reintegration* in reference to activities where former combatants are integrated into the national police forces. When the

task refers to national army or generally to defense forces, we use *MilitaryReform* instead of *PoliceReform* (see below).

## **MilitaryReform**

Military reform refers to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding military institutions. If it is really not clear whether the agent is police or military, then code under both *MilitaryReform* and *PoliceReform*. If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either police or military, then we code both *PoliceReform* and *MilitaryReform*. *MilitaryReform* is also coded in two additional instances. One is when military justice is mentioned. For example, the following paragraph refers to both civilian and military justice system, hence we code both *MilitaryReform* (for the latter) and *JusticeSector* (for the former). Second, we code *MilitaryReform* in combination with *Reintegration* in reference to activities where former combatants are integrated into the national security forces.

*“Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing a military justice system that is complementary to the civil justice system”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as MilitaryReform\_Assist (and JusticeSector\_Assist)*

*“To support the CAR Authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes human rights vetting, in particular to promote accountability of violations of international and domestic law amongst security forces and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into security sector institutions” (S/RES/2448, 2018). This is coded as MilitaryReform\_Assist (and Reintegration\_Assist).*

## **OffensiveOperations**

Offensive Operations refer to offensive interventions (e.g. attacks on non-state armed actors) by the PKO or another international actor. The UN Security Council must mandate the UN PKO to specifically use force against threats and engage in offensive operations, against rebel groups or “terrorist groups”.

This category **excludes** patrolling (which the mission commonly carries out in most deployment areas), stabilization and deterrence activities. It strictly focuses on offensive actions against armed actors, and includes the deployment of special forces such as the Intervention Brigade in DRC. *OffensiveOperations\_Monitor*: is coded if the UNSC resolutions asks the PKO to report on its offensive operations. *OffensiveOperations\_Assist* is coded if the UNSC resolution asks the PKO to conduct offensive operations with the government forces. *OffensiveOperations\_Security* is coded if the UNSC resolution asks the PKO to conduct offensive operations without government.

*“In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the North of Mali, including through long-range patrols, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” (S/RES/2227, 2015). This is coded as **OffensiveOperations\_Assist**.*

*“To deter violence against civilians, including foreign nationals, especially through proactive deployment, active patrolling with particular attention to displaced civilians, including those in protection sites and refugee.” (RES7 2187, 2014). This is coded as **OffensiveOperation\_Security**.*

*“Requests MINUSMA, in pursuit of its relevant priority tasks and active defence of its mandate, to continue anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, to ensure prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and to prevent a return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats” (S/RES/2423, 2018). This is coded as **OffensiveOperation\_Security**.*

*“Encourages MONUC [...] to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to support the FARDC integrated brigades with a view to disarming the recalcitrant foreign and Congolese armed groups”. (S/RES/1794, 2007). This is coded as **OffensiveOperations\_Encouraged**.*

## **JusticeSectorReform**

Justice sector reform comprises activities to re-establish and strengthen judicial and legal systems (Ministry of justice, courts, magistrates, judges, etc.). We **do not** code justice sector unless it is specifically mentioned. However, when justice sector is used in reference to military justice, this is coded as *MilitaryReform*. When no distinction is made, *JusticeSectorReform* is coded.

*“Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing a military justice system that is complementary to the civil justice system” (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as **JusticeSectorReform\_Assist**.*

## **TransitionalJustice**

Transitional justice refers to efforts to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed over the course of an armed conflict. Transitional justice can include war crime prosecutions, truth commissions and reparations, among other mechanisms. Often these mechanisms are designed to operate separately from the rest of the justice system. Examples include the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Prosecutions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) should also be coded here. We code reporting or monitoring on humanitarian law violations only if they related to explicit transitional justice mechanisms. We code *TransitionalJustice\_Monitor* from this paragraph:

*“Request the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law.” (S/RES/814, 1993). This is coded as TransitionalJustice\_Assist. We code this evidence for a PKO activity because the “Special Representative” is mentioned, who is part of the mission. We would not code this evidence if the paragraph would not refer to the Secretary-General.*

We **do not** code *TransitionalJustice\_Monitor* in this paragraph:

*“To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General”. (S/RES/866, 1993).*

Notice that we **do not** code protection provided to tribunals and their personnel since these are not domestic actors.

*“Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor’s Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need”. (S/RES/997, 1993). This is coded as HumanitarianAssistance\_Security and CivilSocietyAssistance\_Security*

## **PrisonReform**

Prison reform aims at improving the conditions in domestic detention facilities (jails at local police stations, prisons).

*“To help reinforce the independence of the judiciary, build the capacities, and enhance the effectiveness of the national judicial system as well as the effectiveness and the accountability of the penitentiary system”. (S/RES/2387, 2017). This is coded as **PrisonReform\_Assist**.*

## **BorderControl**

Border control activities help states secure their borders and collect import taxes. Engagement with custom agents and with immigration services should most likely be coded here.

*“Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges: [...] To monitor and deter the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to support the Government in addressing border security challenges consistent with its existing mandate to protect civilians, including cross-border security and other challenges in the border areas”. (S/RES/2162, 2014). This is coded as **BordedControl\_Assist** and **BorderControl\_Security**.*

## **Demining**

Demining refers to detecting and removing mines and other explosive devices.

*“To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination”. (S/RES/1590, 2005). This is coded as **Demining\_Assist**.*

## **Resources**

The category refers to activities related to natural resources, including timber, rubber, oil, diamonds, gold, iron, and other minerals. This can also include providing or assisting security for extracting natural resources. In addition, providing support to the government in addressing illicit exploitation and smuggling of natural resources is also coded in this category

*” Use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources” (S/RES/1856, 2008). This is coded as **Resources\_Monitor**.*

## **StateAuthority**

State authority comprises activities aimed at re-establishing government control over the territory and extend government control geographically; including border demarcation. It comprises activities aimed at strengthening the basic administrative capacity of the state, for example, in terms of rehabilitating (1) infrastructure (roads, government offices, custom checkpoints); (2) or providing administrative

services, e.g. conducting marriages, providing birth certificates, passports and identity cards, registering new citizens, etc. Providing or re-establishing security (e.g. through offensive operations), however, **should not** be coded here. If the PKO is mandated to provide security for government personnel (ministers, head of state), then we code *StateAuthority\_Security*.

*“To support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the Agreement, especially its Part III and Annex 2, notably ... to support the redeployment of the reformed and reconstituted Malian Defence and Security Forces especially (MDSF) in the Centre and North of Mali,” (S/RES/2295, 2016). This is coded as StateAuthority\_Assist.*

*“Decides to adjust the mandate of UNMEE, in order to assist the Boundary Commission in the expeditious and orderly implementation of its Delimitation Decision, to include with immediate effect: [...] b) administrative and logistical support for the Field Offices of the Boundary Commission.” (S/RES/1430, 2002). This is coded as StateAuthority\_Assist.*

*“To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country.” (S/RES/2100, 2013). This is coded as StateAuthority\_Assist.*

*“To support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation” (S/RES/1528, 2004). This is coded as StateAuthority\_Security.*

## **Democratization**

Democratizations refers to activities for strengthening democratic institutions and building capacity of elected representatives in terms of making them more accountable and responsive to citizens. Examples of democratic institutions might include the parliament, the office of the ombudsman, parliamentary committees, etc. Anti-corruption efforts targeting elected representatives in democratic institutions should be coded here. If the mandate refers to political institutions generally, then we **do not** code it as *Democratization*.

*“Provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the national, provincial, regional and local levels” (S/RES/1756, 2007). This is coded as Democratization\_Assist.*

*“[...] with a particular emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions” (S/RES/1906, 2009). This is coded as Democratization\_Assist.*

*“Contribute to the promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of accountability”. (S/RES/1756, 2007). **This is not coded because too vague.***

*“Decides that the mandate of UNMISS shall be to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours, and accordingly authorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks;... Promoting popular participation in political processes, including through advising and supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on an inclusive constitutional process”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). **We do not code this because it is not aimed directly at specific democratic institutions and the first part does not actually authorize the mission to do something.***

### **ElectoralSecurity**

Electoral security activities refer to activities to protect voters, candidates and election workers as well as the integrity of the election process (or referendum), e.g. election material and infrastructure, from physical attacks. We code electoral security monitoring if the PK is mandated to investigate / monitor / follow-up ... activities “leading up to elections”. We **do not** code *ElectoralSecurity\_Security* and code both (1) assisting the government in providing security for elections or (2) providing security for elections as *ElectoralSecurity\_Assist* because it is usually impossible to infer whether or not the government was involved.

*“To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government’s mandate, leading up to the elections” (S/RES/872,1993).**This is coded as ElectoralSecurity\_Monitor.***

### **ElectoralAssistance**

Election assistance refers to activities to assist the organization of free and fair elections beyond electoral security (assisting peaceful elections). Referendums on independence (e.g. Western Sahara and South Sudan) can be coded here, too. If the PKO is mandated to verify and certify an election (as UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire or UNAVEM in Angola), then we code this under *ElectionAssistance\_Monitor*. We do not code *ElectoralAssistance\_Security* because it basically codes the same as *ElectoralSecurity\_Assist*.

*“The conduct of a limited but reliable international observation of the first and second rounds of the legislative elections” (S/RES/1201, 1998). This is coded as **ElectoralAssistance\_Assist**.*

### **VoterEducation**

Activities that relate to informing voters and candidates on the modalities of the elections and on the importance of fair and peaceful behaviour.

*“Notes with appreciation the ongoing support provided by the Public Information Section of UNAMSIL to the National Electoral Commission in designing and implementing a civic education and public information strategy, and encourages UNAMSIL to continue these efforts”. (S/RES/1389, 2002). This is coded as **VoterEducation\_Encouraged**.*

### **PoliticalPartyAssistance**

Political party assistance refers to support for political parties and former armed groups to become professional, efficient and effective organizations.

*“To provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties;” (S/RES/1159, 1998). This is coded as **PoliticalPartyAssistance\_Assist**.*

### **CivilSocietyAssistance**

Civil society assistance refers to support for domestic civil society organizations to more efficiently and effectively represent citizens' needs and to control government behaviour. Civil society organizations are often also called NGOs, women's groups, youth groups, human rights defenders (which would also be coded in the Human Rights category), etc. In any case, the targeted civil society needs to have some degree of organization so that we can code the evidence as *CivilSocietyAssistance*. *CivilSocietyAssistance* is not used when there are vague references to widening popular support or popular participation. We **do not** code *CivilSocietyAssistance* if the UNSC resolution only refers to “sectors of society”. We **always** code *CivilSocietyAssistance* if the UN PKO is mandated to coordinate or engage in any way with organized civil society.

Notice also that *CivilSocietyAssistance\_Security* is coded when the mission is mandated to protect human rights activists/advocates (but not UN human rights officers).

### **Media**

The category "media" covers economic, technical, and financial assistance to build and strengthen and provide independent domestic media.



*“[A]uthorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks: [...] promoting the establishment of an independent media”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as Media\_Assist.*

## **PublicInfo**

The category describes activities by the PKO to inform residents in its host country about the mission’s activities, the peace process and other political relevant events. This **excludes** voter education campaigns (for which we have a separate category).

*“Welcomes the UNMISS initiative to launch an outreach campaign throughout the country, and encourages the Mission within existing resources to further develop its communication with local communities to improve understanding of the Mission’s mandate” (S/RES/2057, 2012). This is coded as PublicInfo\_Encourage. Notice we do not code ‘welcomes’ here, but only ‘encourages’*

*“To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the UN activities in Somalia” (S/RES/814, 1993). This is coded as PublicInfo\_Assist.*

## **PowerSharing**

Power-sharing refers to any arrangement that divides political power between former belligerents or stakeholders in the peace process. This can include coalitions of national unity; power-sharing within specific state institutions (e.g. the military); geographic forms of power-sharing (e.g. establishment of autonomous regions); etc. We do not have examples of this in our current sample.

## **Reconciliation**

Reconciliation means fostering dialogue between people from different communities and bringing them together to discuss their differences in a peaceful environment. Often the resolution refers to building social cohesion and national unity or to “good offices” in relation to reconciliation activities. Nation-wide reconciliation follows under this category (see below for more local initiatives).

*“To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning” (S/RES/1270, 1999). This is coded as Reconciliation\_Assist.*

*“Commends the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for her good offices efforts and political support and requests that such important efforts and support continue, in particular with a view to the presidential election to be held in October 2015, in line with*

*paragraph 19 (b) of this resolution”. (S/RES/2226, 2015). This is coded as **Reconciliation\_Assist**.*

*“Requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to use her good offices role including to facilitate dialogue between all political stakeholders”. (S/RES/2112, 2013). This is coded as **Reconciliation\_Assist**.*

### **LocalReconciliation**

Local reconciliation refers to reconciliation activities that involves local communities, including local traditional authorities. These initiatives include local conflict resolution, local peacebuilding, strengthening confidence and trust among communities.

*“Exercising good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation at the national, state, and county levels within capabilities to anticipate, prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as **LocalReconciliation\_Assist**.*

### **RegionalReconciliation**

Regional reconciliation refers to reconciliation activities that involve neighbouring states. These initiatives include mandated task of the UN PKO to convene regional conference, mediate between neighbouring states and their host state, and help with concluding agreements on good neighbourly relations.

*“To continue to play a role as observer with UNAMID in the Contact Group that was established under the 13 March 2008 Dakar Accord to monitor its implementation and assist, as necessary, the Governments of Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic to build good neighbourly relations”. S/RES/1861, 2009). This is coded as **RegionalReconciliation\_Monitor**.*

### **EconomicDevelopment**

Economic development refers to activities to restore the economy and financial situation of the country. This includes mandates to acquire funding for economic development and reconstruction. Do only code this category if the report uses the word “economic”, “financial”, “economic restoration, economic reconstruction or very similar terms. As already mentioned, we **do not** code early recovery as *EconomicDevelopment*, unless there is more explicit evidence for this.

*“Urgently requests the Government to develop in close coordination with MONUC, as a matter of priority as part of its effort to extend its authority throughout the Democratic*

*Republic of the Congo, a plan to ensure security in the eastern part of the country, particularly by carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation or resettlement, as appropriate, and reintegration of foreign and Congolese combatants, and by promoting national reconciliation, recovery and development in the region". (S/RES/1756, 2007). Among other fields (e.g. DDR), this is also coded as **EconomicDevelopment\_Assist**.*

*"[E]ncourages UNAMID, within its current mandate, to facilitate the work of the UN Country Team and expert agencies on early recovery and reconstruction in Darfur, inter alia through the provision of area security". (S/RES/1935, 2010). This is coded as **EconomicDevelopment\_Encourages** and **EconomicDevelopment\_Security**.*

*"Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers". (S/RES/1029, 1995). This is not coded due to the general reference to development.*

*"Request the SG to seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from States and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institution and economy of Somalia." (S/RES/814, 1993). This is not coded.*

## **HumanitarianRelief**

Humanitarian relief refers to intervention in emergency situations and humanitarian crises, such as natural disaster relief as well as responses to short-term man-made disasters. Notice that *HumanitarianRelief* also includes humanitarian aid. We always code *HumanitarianRelief\_Assist* if the PKO is mandated to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. We **do not** code *HumanitarianRelief\_Assist* but **do** code *HumanitarianRelief\_Security* if the PKO is only mandated to assist the delivery of aid by providing security (but not with logistical support).

*"... including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas...". (S/RES/929, 1994). We code this as **HumanitarianRelief\_Security**.*

*"Support the provision of humanitarian aid". (S/RES/997, 1995). We code this as **HumanitarianRelief\_Assist**.*

*"To continue to facilitate unhindered humanitarian access and to help strengthening the delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, notably*

*by contributing to enhance security conducive to this delivery” (S/RES/2000, 2011). We code this as **HumanitarianRelief\_Assist**.*

**This other example from MINUSCA is not coded because it refers to coordination on international assistance, not clearly humanitarian:**

*“To coordinate international assistance as appropriate”. (S/RES/2217, 2015). This is not coded.*

### **PublicHealth**

Public health refers to activities aimed at preventing or addressing the consequences of endemic diseases, e.g. Ebola, cholera, *HIV/AIDS*, etc.

*“To coordinate with UNMEER, as appropriate”. (S/RES/2215, 2015). This is coded as **PublicHealth\_Assist**, UNMEER was the Ebola Emergency Response mission in Liberia.*

### **RefugeeAssistance**

Refugee assistance includes the creation, management and maintenance of refugee and IDP camps, as well as the provision of assistance for returnees. This can include assistance to the government to ratify or/and implement treaties on refugee assistance. *While for the category of HumanitarianRelief the phase “creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian relief” can ONLY mean Humanitarianrelief\_Security, for the category “RefugeeAssistance”, the phrase creating conditions conducive to the return of refugees and IDPs can be both refugeeAssistance\_Assist and RefugeeAssistance\_Security because the UN PKO can help refugee return through services other than providing security, e.g. building houses.*

*“Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks”. (S/RES/997, 1995). This is coded as **RefugeeAssistance\_Assist** and **RefugeeAssistance\_Monitor**.*

*“Support government effort... to create an environment conducive to voluntary, safe and dignified return”. (S/RES/1925, 2010). This is coded as **RefugeeAssistance\_Assist** and **RefugeeAssistance\_Security**.*

*“In support of Malian authorities, to contribute to creation of secure environment for safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance [...] and the voluntary, safe, and dignified return [...] of IDP and refugees”. (S/RES/2164, 2014). This is coded as **RefugeeAssistance\_Security**.*

***We do not code references to repatriation of foreign fighter/combatants as RefugeeAssistance.***

## **Gender**

Gender refers to gender mainstreaming in the activities, policies and approaches of international actors. It means that the PKO promotes equality between men and women, including empowerment of women. This can include assistance to the government to ratify or/and implement treaties on women's rights. This can also include meetings with women's representatives. We **do not** code *Gender* if the resolution only mentions women as one among other targets of physical protection efforts or as example of especially vulnerable groups of persons. For example, we code child soldiers under *ChildRights* but **do not** code *Gender* for women combatants. This is an example for *Gender\_Assist* because it refers to human rights treaties that enshrine gender equality.

*“Encourages the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to ratify and implement key international human rights treaties and conventions, including those related to women and children, refugees, and statelessness, and requests UNMISS, with other United Nations actors, to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in this regard;” (S/RES/2057, 2012). This is coded as Gender\_Assist (but also HumanRights\_Assist and ChildRights\_Assist).*

This is an example for **NOT coding** *Gender\_Assist* because it refers to physical protection rather than equality between men and women:

*“To exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the mission's protection strategy, especially in regard to women.” (S/RES/2187, 2014). This is not coded as Gender.*

This is also an example for **not coding** *Gender* because it refers to women as category of combatants (but notice that we code *ChildRights\_Assist* here):

*“Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing and implementing a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, in cooperation with international partners with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is not coded as Gender.*

## **LegalReform**

Legal reform refers to activities whereby international actors become involved in law-making processes. This category **does NOT** include assistance by international actors in formulating "regulations" or "policies" that do not have the force of law. Cue words to distinguish laws from other policies are legislation, law, legislative process, constitutional process, act, draft act, parliament, etc

*“To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies”. (S/RES/1778, 2007). This is coded as LegalReform\_Assist.*

### **Ceasefire**

Ceasefire refers to peacekeepers or other international actors' engagement for agreements between belligerents to stop the fighting (e.g. attacking each other on the ground, by air strikes, etc.). If the resolution states that the PKO is mandated to monitor the (peace) process with the goal of getting to a ceasefire agreement, we only code *Ceasefire* and **do not** code *PeaceProcess*. The example text below is evidence for coding *Ceasefire\_Assist* because the peacekeeping mission is tasked with assisting the Somali parties to respect the ceasefire.

*“Assisting the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", in particular in their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire” (S/RES/ 897, 1994). This is coded as Ceasefire\_Assist.*

Examples of *Ceasefire\_Security* involve deterring and preventing hostile action in the areas where the ceasefire is being implemented.

*“To observe and monitor the implementation of the joint declaration of the end of the war of 6 April 2005 and of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, to prevent, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, any hostile action, in particular within the Zone of Confidence, and to investigate violations of the ceasefire” (S/RES/1609, 2005). This is coded as Ceasefire\_Monitor and Ceasefire\_Security.*

### **PeaceProcess (essentially PeaceAgreement)**

Peace process refers to any international engagement for reaching a **peace agreement (not a ceasefire)** between belligerent parties. We only code this category if the paragraph clearly refers to the process of getting to a peace agreement. Key words are “peace agreement” and “peace process”. Thus, the example text from UNSOM II 897 for coding *Ceasefire\_Assist* is **not** evidence for coding *PeaceProcess\_Assist*

because it deals with the *implementation* of the Peace Agreement (Addis Ababa Agreements) and not with getting / maintaining it.

*“Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;” (S/RES/918, 1994). This is coded as **PeaceAgreement\_Encouraged**.*

*“To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;” (S/RES/872, 1993). This is not coded because it refers to implementation.*

## **UseOfForce**

The variable *UseOfForce* reflects the authorization of using of all necessary means. The mentioning of a Chapter VII mandate is not enough to code *UseOfForce*. The use of force can be mandated for self-defense or for defense of the mandate. It would be good to distinguish the two in the comment section. References to Chapter VII are not sufficient to code *UseOfForce*. Examples are:

- *Underscores the importance of MONUC implementing its mandate in full, including through robust rules of engagement. (S/RES/1843, 2008).*
- *Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities. (S/RES/1313, 2000).*
- *To deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force. (S/RES/1313, 2000).*
- *Authorizes MONUSCO, in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 3 above, to take all necessary measures to perform the following tasks. (S/RES/2147, 2014).*
- *Underscores that UNMISS’ protection of civilians mandate as set out in paragraph 3 (b) (v) of resolution 1996 (2011) includes taking the necessary actions to protect*

*civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence. (S/RES/2109, 2013).*